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INTRODUCTION 
he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938 to 
provide the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of all 
civil actions.1 The underlying theme of the Federal Rules is that 
meritorious litigants should have their day in court.2 To that end, the 
 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
2 Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the 
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288 
(2013) (“As has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court, the distinguished 
proceduralists who drafted the Federal Rules believed in citizen access to the courts and in 
the resolution of disputes on their merits, not by tricks or traps or obfuscation.”). 
T
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Federal Rules eliminated procedural pitfalls, including highly 
technical forms of action inherited from common law, that rewarded 
mastery of pleading techniques over the substantive merits of claims. 
The Federal Rules also introduced a simplified pleading system, 
commonly denominated as “notice pleading,”3 thereby easing the 
heavy burden imposed on the parties. The factual details of the case 
could then be developed through pretrial discovery. The aim was to 
facilitate, not to discourage, trial on the merits. 
Unfortunately, the stated goal of the Federal Rules to provide the 
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of all civil disputes has 
grown elusive. The world has changed significantly in the seventy-
five years since the Federal Rules were initially promulgated. 
Litigation in federal courts has become very expensive and unduly 
lengthy. The cost, length, and complexity of federal cases has made it 
riskier to proceed in federal court. More importantly, many, including 
Justices on the Supreme Court, question the ability of federal judges 
to reach good outcomes.4 
The federal civil justice system is now at the crossroads. Many 
putative litigants have chosen to opt out of the courts in favor of some 
form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), which they perceive as 
cheaper, faster, more private, and less risky than the court system. 
Others opt for foreign forums to avoid the perceived harshness of 
some American laws. Even those matters that are filed in the courts 
rarely go to trial—they are either settled or dismissed on motion. 
While settlement of disputes is normally viewed as desirable, 
settlements that are prompted solely by economic concerns totally 
divorced from the merits of any claims are troublesome. The judicial 
response to the problems of cost and complexity, typified by Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and its progeny, is to dismiss poorly 
 
3 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68, 
at 471 (7th ed. 2011) [hereinafter WRIGHT & KANE]; Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure: 1938–1958, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 450–51 (1958). Not surprisingly, 
these concerns were not unfounded. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555 n.3 (2007) (rejecting the notion “that the Federal Rules somehow dispensed with the 
pleading of facts altogether”). 
4 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 
(2004) (acknowledging that failure to comply with technology sharing requirements under 
Telecommunications Act “can be difficult” for a court to evaluate, and identifying 
exclusionary conduct would prove a “daunting task” for “generalist” antitrust courts 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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pleaded cases at the outset of the litigation, irrespective of substantive 
merit. 
The unintended consequence of these phenomena—the exodus 
from the court system in favor of ADR, settlements, and Twombly—is 
that civil trials are fast becoming obsolete.5 That is most undesirable. 
The availability of a judicial forum to decide claims on the merits 
remains important because it assists in the development of a rational 
legal system that is predictable and accessible to the public and that 
produces outcomes that are fair to the litigants. Yet, if the federal 
courts stand pat and do not take steps to control the costs of litigation, 
the continued slide to irrelevance is inevitable. 
Fortunately, the court system can reverse this decline. The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provide all the necessary tools to control 
costs, minimize delays, and limit the length and complexity of trials. 
Courts simply need to implement these rules in the day-to-day 
management of litigation. In addition, by incorporating technological 
advances, courts can reduce costs, simplify trials, and achieve better 
outcomes. The judicial system is clearly up to these tasks. Now is the 
time to act. 
I 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represented a marked 
departure from the pleading rules developed at common law and built 
on the improvements introduced by the Field Code and similar reform 
statutes.6 First, the Federal Rules created uniform rules of practice 
and procedure throughout the federal civil justice system. Prior to the 
Federal Rules, federal practice and procedure was governed by the 
law of the state in which the federal court was sitting.7 The adoption 
 
5 See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 
60 DUKE L.J. 745, 747 (2010) (“[T]rials are an increasingly small part of the daily routine 
of the federal trial courts. Most district courts now try very few civil or criminal cases        
. . . .”). 
6 See Miller, supra note 2, at 288–89 (“Because the rulemakers were deeply steeped in 
the history of the debilitating technicalities and rigidity that characterized the prior English 
and American procedural systems—that is, the common law forms of action and then the 
codes―the Rules established an easily satisfied pleading regime for stating a grievance 
that abjured factual triviality, verbosity, and technicality.”). 
7 In a series of laws, known as Conformity Acts, Congress directed the federal courts to 
follow state rules of pleading and practice. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
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of uniform rules assured that results in like cases litigated in different 
federal venues would not diverge solely because of differences in 
local procedural rules. 
Second, the Federal Rules modernized pleading and practice by (1) 
eliminating the formal distinctions between law and equity; (2) 
reducing the number of pleadings to three, thus doing away with the 
endless paper exchange that characterized common law pleadings; 
and (3) abolishing technical forms of pleading.8 In addition, the 
Federal Rules introduced a simplified pleading system.9 A pleading 
no longer would have to fit within the confines of a cause of action 
cognizable at common law.10 Nor would the complaint have to 
contain a detailed factual recitation of all the elements necessary to 
make out a cause of action.11 
Rather, the complaint would simply have to provide sufficient 
factual information to put the defendant on notice of the claim and the 
grounds upon which it rests.12 This simplified pleading system, 
known universally as “notice pleading,” is the cornerstone of the 
Federal Rules.13 It was adopted because the drafters concluded that 
historically, the complainant had been asked to do too much.14 It was 
 
MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1002 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter 
WRIGHT & MILLER]. 
8 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 105 (2011) 
[hereinafter Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly]; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 2, 7(a), 8(a). 
Rule 7(a) allows only for complaints, answers, and replies to answers. FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a). 
9 Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 105; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
8(a). 
10 Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 105. 
11 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); see also Miller, supra note 2, at 289 (“As exemplified by 
several of the skeletal Official Forms attached to the Rules, the pleader merely had to say 
that she felt aggrieved and state what was desired—something metaphorically analogous 
to Oliver Twist’s simple request, ‘Please, sir . . . I want more [gruel].’” (alteration in 
original)). 
13 Charles E. Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 144, 154 (1948); Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 106. 
14 See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV. 272, 277 (1942). 
Therefore, it may be concluded that this tendency to seek admissions by detailed 
pleadings is at best wasteful, inefficient, and time-consuming, at most productive 
of confusion as to the real merits of the cause and even of actual denial of justice. 
The continuous experience from common-law pleading down through the 
reversions to pleading formalities recurring under code pleading indicates the 
necessity of having clearly in mind the limited, but important, purposes of 
pleading and how they cannot be pressed wisely beyond such purposes. It 
demonstrates, in the writer’s judgment, the necessity of procedural rules which 
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simply unrealistic to expect a complaint to contain a detailed factual 
recitation of any claim at the outset of the case, especially when at 
least some information was within the exclusive control of the 
defendant. The notice function, on the other hand, is a role for which 
the pleadings are well-suited. The factual details underlying the claim 
could be fleshed out in discovery.15 
Discovery was the “Cinderella of the changes” under the Federal 
Rules.16 The mandatory exchange of information prior to trial is 
designed to prevent unfair surprise and to limit the number of issues 
tried by encouraging admissions of fact and elimination of claims and 
defenses for which there is no factual support.17 It also facilitates 
settlement of claims. Discovery fundamentally altered the way in 
which litigants approached the trial of a lawsuit. Discovery equalizes 
access to proof and thereby levels the litigation playing field.18 
Modern civil trials are nothing more than an orderly presentation of 
what has been learned in discovery. Trial in the sunshine has replaced 
trial by ambush.19 
Third, the guiding principle of the Federal Rules is that litigants 
with meritorious claims ought to have their day in court.20 Looking 
back from a twenty-first century perspective, this goal seems rather 
modest. Yet, it was, and remains, very significant. At common law, 
the goal was to avoid trial.21 It is thus not surprising that common law 
procedures were complicated and difficult to navigate, and that one 
misstep could lead to dismissal with prejudice.22 Similarly, strict 
 
enforce the mandate of simplicity and directness and which are made real and 
compelling by illustrative forms showing what this simplicity means in actual 
experience. And it demonstrates further the need of a continuing rules committee 
to watch lest through habit and practice form comes to dominate substance. 
Id. 
15 See Miller, supra note 2, at 289. 
16 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 3, § 81, at 577. 
17 See id. § 81, at 577–78. 
18 See Miller, supra note 2, at 289. 
19 See Raoul Berger & Abe Karsh, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 
1451, 1451 (1950). 
20 See Miller, supra note 2, at 286; see also Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1901, 1906 (1989) [hereinafter Weinstein, After Fifty Years] (“The drafters’ 
commitment was to a civil practice in which all parties would have ready access to the 
courts and to relevant information, a practice in which the merits would be reached 
promptly and decided fairly. Every claimant would get a meaningful day in court.”). 
21 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 105, 119. 
22 See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1986). 
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pleading requirements often made it difficult to get past motions to 
dismiss.23 The Federal Rules eliminated the land mines from the 
litigation landscape so as to facilitate trial.24 The Federal Rules focus 
on the substance of the claim or defense and not on the manner in 
which it is pleaded.25 If the claim is meritorious, then the claim 
should go to trial.26 
In sum, the drafters of the Federal Rules designed a system in 
which (1) all parties would have access to the courts, (2) parties 
would have access to information relevant to their claims and 
defenses through pretrial discovery,27 (3) the courts would promptly 
and fairly decide cases, and (4) parties would have their day in 
court.28 The federal courthouse was the “beacon” which would guide 
the aggrieved to a just result.29 However, fewer and fewer civil cases 
are tried in federal courts.30 Recent Supreme Court cases have 
encouraged disposition prior to trial;31 and, with that reality in mind, 
litigants may be more willing to settle their disputes. In short, the 
reality of federal civil litigation today differs significantly from the 
vision of the drafters of the Federal Rules. 
B. What Went Wrong? 
For their first decade or so, the Federal Rules worked well.32 
Despite some guerilla opposition,33 federal courts and litigants largely 
 
23 See id. (“[T]he defendant could take comfort in the prospect that the plaintiff could 
ultimately lose because his lawyer bungled the pleading war.”). 
24 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 105. 
25 See id. 
26 Id. 
27 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 3, § 81, at 577. 
28 See Weinstein, After Fifty Years, supra note 20, at 1906. 
29 Id. 
30 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 747. 
31 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (noting that 
deficient claims should “‘be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and 
money by the parties and the court’” (citations omitted)). 
32 See Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating 
Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 245, 249–50 (2010) (“Initially, lawyers seemed to be on 
board with the approach taken by the Federal Rules.”). 
33 See, e.g., Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 109–10 
(S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
If a complaint contains nothing more than general allegations that defendants 
have violated various provisions of the anti-trust laws combined with a prayer for 
relief, such a pleading, . . . becomes a springboard from which the parties dive 
off into an almost bottomless sea of interrogatories, depositions, and pre-trial 
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accepted notice pleading.34 From time to time, the Rules were 
amended, but the changes were incremental.35 Federal litigation 
flourished under these Rules.36 Yet, as early as 1951, the judiciary 
recognized the changing nature of litigation in the federal courts—
specifically that federal antitrust litigation was growing more complex 
and expensive—and established a committee to study the implications 
of these changes.37 Thereafter, the Judicial Conference of the United 
States commissioned the Handbook of Recommended Procedures for 
the Trial of Protracted Cases.38 In the preface to the Handbook, the 
drafters pointed out that the growth in size and complexity of 
American business litigation in federal courts: 
 
proceedings on collateral issues, most of which may have little relationship to the 
true issue in the case.  
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
34 See Kourlis, Singer & Knowlton, supra note 32, at 249–50. 
35 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 107. 
36 Id. 
37 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE REPORT: PROCEDURE IN ANTI-TRUST AND 
OTHER PROTRACTED CASES (1951), reprinted in Leon R. Yankwich, “Short Cuts” in 
Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62 (1951) [hereinafter The Prettyman Report]; see also Breck 
P. McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L. 
REV. 27, 27–29 (1950); see generally Wm. Dwight Whitney, The Trial of an Anti-Trust 
Case, 5 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 449 (1950) (discussing procedural forms that could ease 
expanding antitrust litigation); Milton Handler, Anti-Trust—New Frontiers and New 
Perplexities, 6 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 59 (1951); Leon R. Yankwich, Observations on 
Anti-Trust Procedures, 10 F.R.D. 165 (1951); John T. Chadwell & Richard W. McLaren, 
The Current Status of the Antitrust Laws, U. ILL. L.F. 491 (1950). The Prettyman Report 
addressed problems that 
arise[] when a case brought to the court involves, potentially, many issues, many 
defendants, hundreds of exhibits, thousands of pages of testimony, weeks or 
months of hearings, and hundreds of thousands of dollars. A few sample cases 
and the material involved are: the Hartford-Empire (glass container) case . . . , in 
which 3,300 exhibits were considered and 18,000 pages of record made; the 
Libbey-Owens-Ford (flat glass) case . . . , in which 6,000 exhibits were proposed 
to be offered and 900 were eventually received; the A. & P. case . . . , which 
involved 7,000 exhibits and 45,000 pages of testimony; the United Shoe 
Machinery case . . . , in which the Government offered 4,600 exhibits at one 
time; the Alcoa case . . . involved 15,000 pages of record; the National Lead case 
. . . , [involved] 1,400 exhibits and 5,000 pages of record; there were 3,700 
exhibits in the Imperial Chemical Industries case . . . and 10,600 were processed 
in the Investment Bankers case . . . ; in the American Can Company case . . . 
1,773 exhibits were offered, and in the Food and Grocery Company case . . . 
1,407; Ferguson v. Ford and Dearborn . . . contains 27,000 exhibits and 70,000 
pages of record. 
The Prettyman Report, supra note 37, at 63–64. 
38 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY GRP. ON PROCEDURE IN PROTRACTED LITIG., 
HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES 
(1960). 
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 Modern American business is big and complex, consequently, 
many of its controversies are big and complex. But procedure of the 
courtroom was designed in simpler times and for simpler disputes. 
In its established methods it is unable to cope with the tangled 
skeins of vast business conflicts. Such lawsuits involve hundreds—
even thousands—of documents, and thousands—even tens of 
thousands—of pages of testimony, and weeks and months and even 
years of trial. The normal course is ponderous, expensive and time-
consuming. But more dangerous is the burial of relevant, material 
nuggets of fact in dunes of the irrelevant or immaterial. Accuracy in 
the disposition of issues, the supreme aim of adjudication, becomes 
more and more difficult. So the normal processes of the courts have 
become more and more unsatisfactory in some types of litigation. 
Let it be emphasized this is not the ordinary litigation. Our subject 
is rare in number, the truly complicated, a few hundred amid the 
tens of thousands of cases on federal court calendars.39 
The drafters were quick to identify the sources of these difficulties: 
 The chief faults causing the difficulties in protracted cases were 
easily uncovered. They were (1) lack of central control, so that 
issues were cloudy, examination and cross-examination meandering 
and proffered material unlimited; (2) inadequate organization of 
personnel and material prior to the beginning of formalities, an 
absolute essential to any successful performance involving numbers 
of people or masses of materials; (3) lack of an over-all plan for 
proceeding; and (4) an obstinate adherence to the possible use of 
surprise as a tactic, a tactic obviously impossible in proceedings 
such as these. Time and thought have yielded suggestions for 
remedies.40 
Commentators, even in those early days, focused on discovery as a 
root cause of expense, length, and delay in big cases.41 Concerns with 
the Federal Rules intensified in the 1960s as the litigation landscape 
continued to change and federal cases grew even larger in size, scope, 
and complexity. For example, the federal government’s criminal 
prosecutions in the Electrical Equipment Cases spawned some two 
thousand follow-up private, civil treble damage antitrust actions, 
thereby ushering in the Big Case Era in antitrust.42 Suddenly, 
multiparty, multidistrict litigation became commonplace, imposing an 
 
39 Id. at 9. 
40 Id. at 10. 
41 See Leon R. Yankwich, “Short Cuts” in Long Cases: A Commentary on the Report 
Entitled Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 83 (1953). 
42 Robert A. Cahn, A Look at the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 72 F.R.D. 
211, 211 (1976); see Tony A. Freyer, What Was Warren Court Antitrust?, 2009 SUP. CT. 
REV. 347, 359 (“following the massive electrical equipment cases, private litigation also 
proliferated”). 
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enormous burden on the federal judiciary. To ease this burden, 
Congress created the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, which 
made it possible to consolidate before one federal judge, for pretrial 
purposes, cases involving common claims against the same 
defendants.43 
Procedural changes also contributed to this trend. In 1966, Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to liberalize 
procedures for class actions, making some types of cases, particularly 
antitrust and securities matters, more complex and much more 
expensive to litigate.44 In addition, changes in substantive law, 
notably the enactment of stronger civil rights laws and environmental 
laws allowing private rights of action, helped to reshape federal 
dockets. Similarly, judicial endorsement of products liability theories, 
which made it easier for plaintiffs to recover in personal injury cases, 
led to an influx of torts suits. Courts also began to recognize and 
embrace scientific evidence, when that evidence could shed light on 
liability and damage issues. 
Moreover, dramatic advances in technology made it both possible 
and efficient for litigants to create, generate, distribute, store, and 
retrieve mountains of data. As a result, litigants typically have access 
to vast troves of electronically stored information (ESI). However, the 
sheer volume of such data may literally bury courts and litigants in 
paper; and the costs of locating, retrieving, and utilizing ESI are 
prohibitive. Word processing significantly lowered the cost of 
preparing pleadings, discovery requests and responses, motions, 
briefs, and other court papers. Technological advances have also 
dramatically altered the mode and presentation of evidence at trials. 
Additionally, greater sophistication on the part of enforcement 
agencies and the wrongdoers that they prosecute has led to more 
complicated cases. 
Finally, discovery has not always operated in the cooperative and 
collegial manner anticipated by the drafters.45 Discovery was 
 
43 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
44 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note. 
45 See Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2009). 
It would be reasonable to expect, in light of all the applicable rules and governing 
precedents, that experienced attorneys, especially those who have handled major 
litigation, would be able to proceed through the discovery and pretrial stages with 
a conciliatory attitude and a minimum of obstruction, and that, under the guiding 
hand of the district court, the path to ultimate disposition would be a relatively 
smooth one. 
Id. 
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conceived by the drafters of the Federal Rules largely as a self-
policing enterprise, with judicial intervention necessary only when the 
process breaks down. While discovery may proceed appropriately in 
many, if not most, federal civil cases, there is significant empirical 
research showing that discovery is problematic in complex cases.46 
Discovery abuse takes many forms—overdiscovery, failure to comply 
with legitimate discovery requests, redundant requests, inundating the 
discovering party with reams of paper, and frivolous objections, for 
example—and it inevitably creates costly and unproductive satellite 
litigation. 
Nor did the drafters of the Federal Rules foresee that the 
procedures put in place under the rules would lead to a loss of 
confidence in the civil justice system. Among defendants and those 
likely to be named as defendants, a growing distrust of juries 
emerged.47 Perceptions of runaway juries fueled calls for tort reform, 
a euphemism for hard caps on damage recoveries or out-and-out 
limitations on the right to sue.48 The ability of lay jurors to reach 
reasoned results in complex litigation has also been called into 
question.49 
At first blush, criticisms of juries seem harsh. Juries are revered in 
the American civil justice system.50 The right to a jury trial is rooted 
in the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is 
particularly noteworthy that under English law, the source of the 
American jury system, the right to a jury trial has never been viewed 
as constitutional in nature. Not everyone shares the American 
reverence for juries. If you were to tell a defendant in a United States 
 
46 Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal 
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 790 (1980). 
47 Michelle L. Findley, Statutory Tort Caps: What States Should Do When Available 
Funds Seem Inadequate, 46 IND. L. REV. 849, 853 (2013); see also Madelyn Chortek, The 
Psychology of Unknowing: Inadmissible Evidence in Jury and Bench Trials, 32 REV. 
LITIG. 117, 128 (2013) (noting an “increasing skepticism and distrust of juries” and 
concomitant “widespread assumption that judges are better than juries at avoiding 
cognitive pitfalls”). 
48 Findley, supra note 47, at 853; see WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: 
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 152–77 (1981). 
49 For example, it has been suggested that loss causation calculated by “lie-truth-drop” 
is needed because jurors cannot ascertain the financial impact of a misstatement. See John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject 
Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. L. 533, 533–34 (2005). 
50 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 38.02 [1] (2d ed. 
1971) (“The jury is like rock music. Classical theory frowns; the masses applaud. And in a 
democracy the felt need of the masses has a claim upon the law.”). 
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court who comes from outside of the Anglo-American system that his 
or her case will be decided by six individuals, chosen at random, who 
know nothing about the parties or the facts, you would likely get 
looks of incredulity, if not abject horror. 
The distrust of juries also extends to federal judges. Critics of the 
federal civil justice system call judges to task for their failure to 
control runaway verdicts through remittitur, granting of new trials on 
damages issues, or granting motions for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.51 Trial judges have also been faulted for failure to dismiss 
infirm cases on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.52 As a 
result—critics contend—defendants are forced to settle cases, not on 
the merits, but rather to avoid large outlays to defend against claims 
of wrongdoing in court.53 
II 
REACTIONS 
Litigants have reacted to the perceived ills of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in three ways: (1) by pressing for rule changes, (2) by 
seeking changes to procedure through common law, and (3) by opting 
out of the judicial system. 
A. Rule Changes 
The perceived shortcomings of the Federal Rules can be changed 
through the amendment process. Initially, the Advisory Committee 
was slow to act. Even as cases grew more complicated and expensive 
through the 1960s and 1970s, and calls for reform came from many 
constituencies,54 the Advisory Committee stood pat and declined to 
act. However, as criticism of the pretrial process persisted, the 
Advisory Committee responded with significant rule changes in 1983. 
 
51 See, e.g., John E. Sullivan III, Asset Protection for Ohioans: Why the Planning Is 
Better Outside Ohio, 20 OHIO PROB. L.J. 74 (2009) (citing DiCosta v. Aeronaves de 
Mexico, S.A., 973 F.2d 1490, 1494–98 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Closing the Courthouse Doors, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 375, 389–90 (2011) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has “dramatically limited the availability of punitive damages based on 
distrust of juries” and also distrust of “the ability of trial judges to control their awards”). 
52 See Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in 
Antitrust Suits−The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9–12 
(1971) [hereinafter Handler, The Shift]. 
53 Id. 
54 See Miller, supra note 2, at 360 (“Even then the defense bar and their clients were 
voicing complaints about abusive and frivolous litigation and the need for cost 
reduction―the drumbeat was constant and noisy.”). 
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1. Early Efforts 
In 1976, at a symposium commemorating the seventieth 
anniversary of Roscoe Pound’s speech on the popular dissatisfaction 
with the administration of justice, the Chief Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court and others called for sweeping changes to the 
federal legal system.55 Following the 1976 Pound Conference, pretrial 
discovery became the focal point of criticism.56 Critics contended that 
discovery had gotten out of control, and that high costs forced 
innocent defendants to buy peace rather than defend against 
insubstantial claims.57 They called courts to task for not controlling 
discovery.58 They sought to limit the scope of discovery, attacking the 
“relevant to the subject matter” and “reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence” standards.59 Critics, however, 
failed to craft a satisfactory alternative for standards that had been in 
effect since day one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Advisory Committee resisted efforts to rein in the scope of discovery, 
contending that discovery abuse was not pervasive, and choosing 
instead to address specific abusive discovery practices in the 1980 
Amendments.60 That action did not assuage critics. Justice Powell, 
 
55 See generally Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976). 
56 William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the 
Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978) (“Wild fishing 
expeditions, since any material which might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
is discoverable, seem to be the norm.”); see also Paul V. Niemeyer, Is Now the Time for 
Simplified Rules of Civil Procedure?, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 673, 678–79 (2013); 
Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 753–60 (1998). 
57 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740–41 (1975); see also 
Handler, The Shift, supra note 52, at 9–10 (describing how the costs of responding to 
discovery in a class action suit can exceed what individuals can afford and could force 
them to settle). 
58 See Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone 
Awry?, in Addresses Delivered, supra note 55, at 203: 
Judges throw up their hands and ask how they can examine a million documents 
and say whether they are relevant, and the problem is all too often solved by 
simply giving plaintiffs access to all of defendant’s files and records, relevant 
and irrelevant. And thus the second evil emerges-a massive and unequalled 
invasion of privacy and business records. 
See also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM IN AMERICA 3 (asserting that discovery accounts for more than eighty percent of 
the time and cost of litigation). 
59 See Am. Bar Ass’n [ABA], Section of Litig., Second Report of the Special 
Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137, 157–58 (1980). 
60 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980). 
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describing the 1980 Amendments to Rule 33 as “tinkering changes,” 
called for systemic reform.61 
2. The 1983 Amendments 
Stung by this criticism, the Advisory Committee then went back to 
work. The Supreme Court approved a new package of reforms in 
1983 to combat abusive practices and tactical behavior in pleadings 
and in motion practice, in pretrial discovery, and at pretrial 
conferences by amending Rules 11, 16, and 26.62 Rule 11 was 
strengthened to provide for mandatory sanctions against parties 
engaged in abusive pleading practices.63 Rule 16 as amended gave the 
judge more discretionary authority to manage the pretrial phase of the 
case, and it empowered the court to sanction parties who did not 
cooperate at pretrial conferences.64 Rule 26 as amended mandated 
sanctions against parties engaged in abusive behavior on discovery.65 
The 1983 package represented a change in philosophy in dealing 
with abuse in the pretrial phase of the case, inaugurating a “get tough” 
policy and featuring an iron boot approach to effectuating attitudinal 
changes among members of the bar. The courts had always had the 
authority, both inherent and rule-based, to deal with abusive conduct 
in the pretrial phase of litigation.66 Yet, the courts rarely invoked that 
authority. Rule 11 had been notably underutilized.67 Moreover, courts 
were reluctant to impose discovery sanctions, preferring instead to 
 
61 See id. at 1000 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
62 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THEIR ADVISORY NOTES 
1–2 (1982), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules 
/Reports/CV03-1982.pdf. 
63 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
66 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975) 
(recognizing inherent powers of courts to sanction parties who have acted vexatiously or in 
bad faith); FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 37; see 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012); Edward D. Cavanagh, 
Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499, 503–511 (1986) [hereinafter Cavanagh, Developing Standards] 
(discussing courts’ ability to impose sanctions under the original Rule 11 and the amended 
Rule 11); see generally Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (determining that a 
district court had the authority to impose sanctions for a party’s bad faith conduct); 
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991) 
(concluding that lower courts applied the correct standard when deciding a party’s 
monetary sanctions). 
67 See Cavanagh, Developing Standards, supra note 66, at 504–06. 
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cajole the parties into compliance.68 The drafters concluded that this 
approach had not worked and charted a new course for discovery 
reform. 
Even though the thrust of the 1983 Amendments was discovery 
reform, Rule 11 quickly became the most frequently used tool in the 
newly created sanctions arsenal.69 The number of reported cases 
dealing with discovery sanctions has been far outstripped by the 
volume of Rule 11 cases.70 Although the relative inactivity under 
Rule 26(g) does not conclusively demonstrate that discovery abuse 
has been eliminated, one can fairly assume that if discovery abuse 
remained a significant problem after the 1983 Amendments took 
effect, parties and the courts would have utilized Rule 26(g) sanctions 
to a far greater extent than they have in fact. Accordingly, assertions 
made subsequently—particularly by a Brookings Institute study71 
finding that discovery abuse remained a problem in the late 1980s—
are questionable. 
3. The 1993 Amendments 
The far-reaching changes implemented by the 1983 Amendments, 
however, did not quell the cries for reform. Each of the three branches 
of the federal government responded by the end of the decade. 
Congress established the Federal Courts Study Committee in 1988.72 
Then-Senator Joe Biden and others introduced the Civil Justice 
 
68 See Edward D. Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery 
Through Local Rules, 30 VILL. L. REV. 767, 774–76 (1985) [hereinafter Cavanagh, The 
1983 Amendments]. 
69 Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: Requiescat in Pace, 173 
F.R.D. 565, 572 (1997) [hereinafter Cavanagh, Requiescat]. 
70 Id. 
71 See BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN CIVIL 
LITIGATION (1989) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL]. The Brookings Institute Task Force 
was convened at Chairman Biden’s request. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, 
AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 1 (1996) [hereinafter THE RAND REPORT]. It included: 
“leading litigators from the plaintiffs’ and defense bar, civil and women’s rights lawyers, 
attorneys representing consumer and environmental organizations, representatives of the 
insurance industry, general counsels of major corporations, former judges, and law 
professors,” but no sitting judges. Id. 
72 Federal Courts Study Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4644 (1990). The 
Federal Courts Study Committee consisted of fifteen members named by the Chief Justice 
and charged with addressing the perceived crises in the federal court system and reporting 
to Congress on how to remedy that crisis. 
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Reform Act73 (CJRA), a master plan for sweeping procedural reform 
of the federal civil justice system; at the grass roots, it was aimed at 
reducing unnecessary cost and delay in civil litigation and assuring 
that the federal courts would be accessible to all litigants and not only 
to those who are well-off financially. 
Persuaded by two well-publicized studies74 that had concluded that 
litigation in the federal courts was too costly and too slow, and 
concerned that procedural reform efforts under the Rules Enabling 
Act were “incremental and languid,”75 Congress adopted the CJRA,76 
which featured a “bottom-up” approach to reform that required each 
federal district court to assess the specific causes of unnecessary cost 
and delay within that district. Each district was then mandated to 
design a plan to address these problems. In designing cost and delay 
reduction plans, districts were encouraged to experiment and 
innovate. Congress hoped that this process would generate creative 
solutions locally that could then be implemented nationally. 
At about the same time that the CJRA was being debated in 
Congress, the Advisory Committee, which had already been revisiting 
mandatory sanctions under Rule 11,77 also considered the desirability 
of further discovery reform, including numerical limits on 
interrogatories and depositions. The enactment of the CJRA not only 
galvanized the Advisory Committee into action, but it also put the 
Advisory Committee under considerable pressure to develop rules 
that would be compatible with CJRA reform principles and, at the 
same time, leave room for local experimentation.78 From this effort 
 
73 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 [CJRA], Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–82 (2012)). 
74 See generally JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 71; HUMPHREY TAYLOR & GARY L. 
SCHMERMUND, PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A STUDY 
CONDUCTED FOR THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE, INC. (1989), reprinted in The Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 91–184 (1990); R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial 
Reporting Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 
687, 689 n.13 (1993). 
75 Jeffrey J. Peck, “Users United”: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 107–09 (1992). 
76 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 471). 
77 Comm. on Rules of Prac. and Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Call for Written 
Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules (Aug. 
1990), reprinted in 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990). 
78 Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 58 (“[T]he 1993 
revision of the discovery rules authorizing local variations was put forward by the Civil 
Rules Committee of that time in the belief that authority for local rules was needed if 
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emerged the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The 1993 Amendments had two prominent features. First, they 
abolished mandatory sanctions under Rule 11 and left the issue to the 
trial court’s discretion.79 The Advisory Committee was concerned 
that Rule 11 sanctions had become routine, and that the threat of 
mandatory sanctions had a chilling effect on meritorious claims.80 
Second, the 1993 Amendments further refined the discovery 
process by (1) mandating automatic disclosure (production without 
prior request) of certain facts,81 expert testimony,82 trial evidence,83 
and the identity of witnesses;84 (2) presumptive limits on the number 
of interrogatories85 (twenty-five) and depositions (ten per side);86 (3) 
requiring counsel to meet and confer to develop a discovery plan prior 
to the commencement of discovery;87 and (4) mandating a pre-
discovery conference with the court.88 These Amendments took effect 
nearly three years after the enactment of the CJRA;89 and, in some 
cases, the new national rules were at odds with cost-reduction plans 
adopted by district courts pursuant to the CJRA.90 To avoid 
inconsistencies with the CJRA plans, the 1993 Amendments 
authorized local district courts to opt out of the new discovery 
standards, and more than half of the federal courts elected to do so.91 
 
discovery variations were to be legitimately included in local plans promulgated under the 
CJRA.”). 
79 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
80 See supra note 68. 
81 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
82 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2). 
83 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3). 
84 Id. 
85 FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a). 
86 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A). 
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
88 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
89 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 [CJRA], Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2012)). 
90 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
91 DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS’ RESPONSES TO 
SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26, at 6 (1994) 
(“Altogether, 52 courts have exempted cases from the requirements of Rule 26(a)(1). Of 
these, however, sixteen require disclosure through local rules or orders or the CJRA plan, 
and thirteen specifically give individual judges authority to require initial disclosure.”); see 
generally Cavanagh, Requiescat, supra note 69, at 591. 
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Mandatory automatic disclosure was easily the most controversial 
feature of the 1993 discovery amendments. Voluntary disclosure of 
information—the exchange of relevant materials without the necessity 
of a formal discovery request—is a laudable goal and, if implemented 
widely, would likely achieve significant savings during the discovery 
phase of a case. At the same time, it is pure Pollyanna to think that, in 
the real world of federal litigation at this point in time, voluntary 
disclosure could lessen significantly the need for formal discovery. 
Voluntary disclosure runs contrary to many lawyers’ instincts. The 
trial of a civil case in federal court is an adversary process. So too is 
the pretrial phase of the case. It is hard enough to get parties to turn 
over information, especially prejudicial information, when 
specifically requested on discovery. Accordingly, it is naïve to think 
that parties would be willing to exchange this information voluntarily. 
It is especially naïve for Congress to offer this vehicle as a cost-
savings device when a principal concern of the Brookings Institute 
study was discovery abuse.92 
The futility of mandatory automatic disclosure is further illustrated 
by the failure of mandatory automatic disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to gain any significant 
following.93 Perhaps no amendment to the Federal Rules has been as 
vilified as mandatory automatic disclosure.94 As noted above, a 
significant number of district courts rejected mandatory automatic 
disclosure outright.95 Mandatory automatic disclosure has not caught 
on with the profession, and indeed it has continued to engender 
criticism long after its adoption in 1993.96 It has been reduced to a 
 
92 See JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 71. 
93 See STIENSTRA, supra note 91. 
94 Compare George F. Hritz, Plan Will Increase Cost, Delay Outcomes, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 
13, 1993, at 2 (predicting that automatic disclosure will prove costly and inefficient), and 
Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. 
REV. 1 (1992) (questioning viability of mandatory disclosure), and Laura A. Kaster & 
Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 
15 (commenting that mandatory disclosure impinges on work product and attorney/client 
protections), with Charles P. Sifton, Experiment a Bold and Thoughtful Step, N.Y. L.J., 
Apr. 13, 1993, at 3 (noting that automatic disclosure in most cases will make civil 
discovery less adversarial), and Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 
BROOK. L. REV. 263, 267 (arguing that mandatory disclosure amendments to Rule 26 will 
reduce costs and delay). 
95 See supra note 91. 
96 See Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 Federal Civil Rules Amendments, 22 
CARDOZO L. REV. 75, 76 (2000) (“Practically all elements of the organized bar 
vociferously criticized the suggestions for automatic disclosure”). 
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nonevent. If mandatory automatic disclosure has failed, then a 
fortiori, voluntary disclosure is doomed to failure. 
4. The 2000 Amendments 
On January 28, 1997, the RAND Corporation—which had been 
commissioned by the Judicial Conference of the United States 
pursuant to the CJRA to conduct an empirical study of the efficacy of 
the CJRA reforms—released its final report.97 The RAND study 
concluded that, as implemented, the package of reforms embodied in 
the CJRA had had no real impact on the “time to disposition, 
litigation costs, and attorney’s satisfaction and views of the fairness of 
case management.”98 The RAND study further concluded that neither 
mandatory automatic disclosure nor voluntary disclosure had had any 
meaningful impact in reducing costs and delays in litigation.99 The 
RAND study suggested that courts could best limit excessive cost and 
delay by setting and adhering to strict deadlines for the completion of 
discovery and the commencement of trial.100 
Congress mercifully allowed the CJRA to sunset on December 31, 
1997, as prescribed by the statute itself.101 The CJRA’s death set the 
stage for the next phase of discovery reform. In 2000, the Federal 
Rules introduced further restrictions on discovery depositions by 
presumptively limiting a deposition to one seven-hour day.102 The 
new rules also significantly trimmed back the mandatory automatic 
disclosure obligations under Rule 26(a). The 2000 amendments 
require disclosure of: (1) the identity of the witnesses and documents 
that a party will use to support its claim or defense, (2) the identity of 
retained testifying experts, and (3) the identity of evidence that a party 
 
97 See THE RAND REPORT, supra note 71. The foregoing report is actually an executive 
summary of three technical reports comprising RAND’s analysis of the CJRA. Id. at v. 
Prepared for the Judicial Conference, the RAND Report “provides an overview of the 
purpose of the CJRA, the basic design of the evaluation, the key findings, and their policy 
implications.” Id. The three technical reports are: JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON 
DISTRICTS (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE 
MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET 
AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996). 
98 THE RAND REPORT, supra note 71, at 1. 
99 Id. at 16–17. 
100 Id. at 1–2. 
101 See Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5090, § 103(b)(2) (1990). 
102 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1). 
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contemplates using at trial.103 In addition, the Federal Rules, for the 
most part, no longer allow individual districts to opt out by local 
rule.104 
In perhaps the most far-reaching change ever made by the 
Advisory Committee, the 2000 Amendments significantly narrowed 
the scope of discovery from “relevant to the subject matter” to 
“relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”105 Nevertheless, if a party 
finds that discovery is inadequate under the “relevant to any party’s 
claim or defense” standard, that party can then seek court permission 
to obtain discovery of materials “relevant to the subject matter” of the 
litigation.106 The upshot of the amended rule is that discovery is 
presumptively limited to matters relevant to a claim or defense, and 
only upon a showing to the court that such discovery is inadequate 
can additional discovery be obtained.107 
5. The 2006 Amendments 
In 2006, in recognition of the enormous importance of information 
stored on electronic media, the Advisory Committee adopted rules 
dealing specifically with electronically stored information. The 
amendments clarify that electronically stored information is 
equivalent to the paper document stored in hard copy.108 The Federal 
Rules direct parties to address issues relating to electronically stored 
information during the discovery planning process and that pretrial 
scheduling orders include provisions for discovery of electronically 
stored information.109 The Federal Rules also contained detailed 
provisions for sanctions for failure to comply with discovery requests 
for electronically stored information.110 However, the rules leave it up 
 
103 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)–(3). 
104 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT ON THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 47 (1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules 
/Reports/CV05-1999.pdf (“[The 2000 Amendments] narrow the initial disclosure 
obligation and remove the previous authority to ‘opt out’ of this requirement by local 
rule.”). 
105 See id. at 5–6; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
106 See REPORT ON THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 104, at 5–6; FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(b)(1) (“For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the action.”). 
107 See REPORT ON THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 104, at 48. 
108 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A). 
109 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii), 26(f)(3)(C). 
110 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
CAVANAGH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  10:33 AM 
2015] Federal Civil Litigation at the Crossroads: Reshaping the 651 
Role of the Federal Courts in Twenty-First Century Dispute Resolution 
to the courts to determine any limitations on discovery of 
electronically stored information on a case-by-case basis.111 
6. The Proposed 2015 Amendments 
The Advisory Committee has proposed a series of rule changes that 
are designed to promote early and effective judicial case management 
by (1) accelerating the timeframe for filing complaints and issuing 
scheduling orders; (2) directing that scheduling conferences be 
conducted in person or through simultaneous communication, thereby 
eliminating scheduling conferences by mail; (3) mandating that 
scheduling orders address subjects, including (a) preservation of 
electronically stored documents, (b) agreements to prevent waiver of 
privilege or work product under Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, and (c) pre-motion conferences in which the court is asked 
to intervene in discovery matters; (4) adding two items to the 
discovery plan under Rule 26(f): the preservation of electronically 
stored information and agreements to protect against waiver of 
privilege or work product under Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence; and (5) modifying the existing discovery timeline to permit 
filing Rule 34 document requests prior to the Rule 26(f) discovery 
conference.112 
a. Timing of Complaint and Scheduling Order 
The Advisory Committee is of the view that early stages of 
litigation take too long, thereby adding to the cost of litigation.113 
Accordingly, the proposed amendments shorten the time in which to 
 
111 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), 16(b). The Advisory Committee note to Rule 26 suggests 
that a judge consider the following factors in determining whether to allow discovery of 
electronically stored information: 
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information 
available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce 
relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available 
on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant, 
responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed 
sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further 
information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the 
parties’ resources. 
112 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT ON THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 4–6, 18–19, 22–23 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies 
/rules/Reports/CV05-2013.pdf. 
113 Id. at 4. 
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serve a complaint from 120 days to 60 days from the date of filing.114 
The proposed amendments also reduce the time for issuing a 
scheduling order from 120 days after a defendant has been served or 
90 days after a defendant has appeared, to 90 days and 60 days, 
respectively.115 
b. Scheduling Conferences 
The Advisory Committee is of the view that scheduling 
conferences are most effective if parties engage, via telephone or 
through “more sophisticated electronic means.”116 Accordingly, the 
current authorization to conduct scheduling conferences by mail is 
abrogated.117 
c. Additional Topics for Scheduling Orders 
Authorizing scheduling orders to provide for preservation of 
electronically stored information, and to include agreements to 
prevent waiver of privilege and work product, are intended to remind 
litigants that these are useful topics to discuss and agree upon at the 
outset of litigation.118 The proposed rule authorizing pre-motion 
conferences on discovery issues was added in light of the experience 
of many judges who find that such conferences can resolve disputes 
informally without the need for formal briefs, thereby saving the 
litigants, and the courts, both time and money.119 The question of 
whether to require such promotion conferences falls within the 
judge’s discretion.120 
d. Content of Discovery Plans 
Consistent with the above-discussed proposals affecting the content 
of scheduling orders under proposed Rule 16(b)(3), discovery plans 
may include provisions for the preservation of electronically stored 
information and court orders on agreements under Rule 502 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to prevent waiver of privilege and attorney 
work product.121 
 
114 Id. at 4, 17 (Proposed Rule 4(m)). 
115 Id. at 18–19 (Proposed Rule 16(b)(2)). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 18 (Proposed Rule 16(b)(1)). 
118 Id. at 7 (Proposed Rule 16(b)(3)). 
119 Id. at 7–8 (Proposed Rule 16(b)(3)(v)). 
120 Id. at 8. 
121 Id. at 19 (Proposed Rules 16(b)(3)(B), 26(f)(3)(C)–(D)). 
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e. Accelerating the Timing of Document Requests 
By relaxing the discovery moratorium to permit document requests 
prior to the entry of a Rule 26(f) discovery plan, the Advisory 
Committee intended to promote focused discussion of those document 
demands during the discovery conference.122 This procedure would 
assist with early discovery planning and also allow concrete disputes 
over the scope of discovery to be brought before the court at the 
outset of the litigation.123 The Advisory Committee hopes to promote 
discussions regarding document requests at discovery conferences so 
that parties resolve more disputes without judicial intervention.124 
7. Summary 
Unquestionably, the Advisory Committee on Federal Civil Rules 
has recognized the changing face of federal civil litigation, especially 
the mounting costs and increased complexity of modern cases. The 
Advisory Committee also has always been at the forefront of the 
debate about how to address these issues. Its response has generally 
been deliberate and incremental, reflecting a strong faith in the 
wisdom of the rules as initially promulgated. For example, the 
Advisory Committee for years resisted limiting the scope of discovery 
and imposing numerical limits on interrogatories and depositions.125 
Yet, the rules, notably the rules governing discovery, have changed 
significantly since 1938. No longer can parties pursue a “scorched 
earth” or “no stone unturned” discovery agenda. Discovery must be 
proportional to the needs of the case. Interrogatories and depositions 
are subject to presumptive limitations. Trial courts have broad powers 
to manage discovery and to thereby rein in unnecessary costs and 
delays. Nevertheless, not all litigants were thrilled with the actions of 
the Advisory Committee, and they turned directly to the courts to 
achieve change. 
B. The Courts 
The Supreme Court has been notably active in effectuating 
procedural reforms in two areas: summary judgment and pleading 
standards. At the summary judgment stage, trial courts must 
 
122 Id. at 8–9 (Proposed Rule 26(d)(2)). 
123 Id. 
124 See id. 
125 Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 107. 
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thoroughly assess the evidence developed on discovery to assure that 
the parties have presented genuine issues of fact for juries to decide. 
Similarly, the High Court has directed trial judges to carefully 
scrutinize complaints at the motion to dismiss stage to satisfy 
themselves that the claims asserted warrant the costs of discovery. 
1. Summary Judgment 
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a 
party is entitled to summary judgment if it can show that, based on the 
pleadings and all materials properly before the court, there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.126 The summary judgment procedure 
has always been part of the Federal Rules; yet, in its early years, Rule 
56 was underutilized.127 This was due, in part, to the perception 
among some judges that granting summary judgment would somehow 
short circuit the litigants’ rights to their day in court, a fundamental 
goal of the Federal Rules.128 In addition, there was concern that 
summary judgment was simply inappropriate in certain kinds of 
cases, such as antitrust cases. The Supreme Court’s decision in Poller 
v. CBS, Inc. is instructive here.129 In Poller, the Court denied 
defendant’s summary judgment motion, holding that “summary 
procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation 
where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the 
hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the 
plot.”130 Some observers viewed Poller as effectively reading 
summary judgment out of antitrust cases,131 even though the Supreme 
Court subsequently—and explicitly—rejected that notion shortly after 
Poller came down.132 
Added to the ambiguity of the Poller holding was the ambiguity of 
Rule 56 itself. The rule did not define “genuine issue” or “material 
 
126 FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
127 See 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56App.101[3] 
(3d ed. 1999) (noting a general sense that summary judgment was “extremely difficult to 
obtain”). 
128 See Hamilton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1504 (10th Cir. 
1992) (expressing concern that summary judgment may hinder plaintiff’s ability to fully 
present its case). 
129 368 U.S. 464 (1962). 
130 Id. at 473. 
131 See EDWARD BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 9:3, at 309–10 (3d ed. 2006). 
132 See First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–90 (1968). 
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fact.”133 It was unclear who had the burden of proof on a summary 
judgment motion—whether that burden paralleled the burdens at trial 
and how that burden was met on the motion.134 In the face of these 
uncertainties, courts understandably were hesitant to grant summary 
judgment. That, in turn, caused defendants to lose faith in the 
supervisory powers of the courts and their will to dismiss infirm cases 
prior to trial.135 
All of that changed in the spring of 1986, when the Supreme Court 
handed down three decisions that clarified and revitalized summary 
judgment procedures. 
a. Matsushita 
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
Zenith, an American electronics firm, sued rival Japanese electronics 
manufacturers alleging, inter alia, that the Japanese sellers had 
conspired to drive Zenith from the field by agreeing to engage in 
predatory pricing, that is, selling below their costs.136 The defendants 
moved for summary judgment.137 Matsushita presented significant 
substantive and procedural issues. Substantively, the question was 
whether a predatory pricing scheme is even a plausible competitive 
tactic.138 The theory of a predatory pricing claim is that a dominant 
seller or group of sellers with deep pockets can drive targeted rivals 
out of business by selling at a loss.139 Deep pocket predators can 
withstand short-term losses better than the target.140 Once the target 
has exited the field, the dominant seller has the market to itself, can 
reap monopoly profits, and can recoup any short-term losses suffered 
while the scheme was in place.141 
 
133 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded 
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2097 (1989). 
134 See id. at 2100–01, 2100 n.168. 
135 See id. at 2097 (“Rule 56 has been enfeebled by courts reluctant to take 
responsibility for assessing the genuineness of contentions.”). 
136 475 U.S. 574, 577–78 (1986). 
137 Id. at 578. 
138 Id. at 588–90. 
139 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986). 
140 See id. 
141 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588–89. 
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In the real world, however, a predatory pricing strategy is very 
risky and simply does not make rational business sense.142 First, for 
the scheme to succeed, the predator must incur losses in the short 
term.143 This would be anathema for most companies, which operate 
on a for-profit model.144 A predatory pricing scheme is not like 
selling at low profit margins in which large volume would yield large 
profits.145 In a predatory pricing scenario, every sale exacerbates 
losses. Simply put, a predator does not “make it up on volume.” 
Second, assuming the dubious proposition that a company is 
willing to incur losses to force out a rival, it is not clear how long 
losses would have to be incurred before the target exited the field. In 
Matsushita, the scheme was allegedly in place for more than twenty 
years and still had not brought Zenith to its knees.146 Few companies 
would commit to open-ended losses in the hope that sooner or later a 
rival would capitulate. 
Third, even if the defendants could successfully drive Zenith from 
the field, there is no guarantee that a new company would not arise 
from the ashes and emerge as a viable rival.147 In that case, the 
process of selling at a loss would begin anew. Given the inherent risks 
of a predatory pricing scheme, rational sellers would be hesitant to 
embrace it as a plausible business strategy. 
In addition to these substantive issues, Matsushita raised 
significant procedural issues. Did Zenith present sufficient evidence 
to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat the 
summary judgment motion? Zenith’s only real evidence of agreement 
was that defendants sold at low prices.148 That evidence was at best 
ambiguous.149 It may be that defendants had conspired to set low 
prices. However, an equally plausible explanation of defendants’ 
conduct was that they were aggressively competing for sales.150 The 
low prices spurred competition and benefitted consumers.151 In other 
 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 588. 
144 See id. 
145 See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 118 (“price cutting [is] aimed simply at increasing market 
share”). 
146 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 592. 
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 594. 
149 See id. (“But cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of 
competition.”). 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
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words, defendants’ conduct was arguably consistent with the antitrust 
laws. 
The Supreme Court concluded that Zenith had failed to create a 
genuine issue of material fact; this is, it failed to adduce sufficient 
evidence to raise a question about which reasonable people could 
disagree.152 The Court ruled that the range of inferences that can be 
drawn from ambiguous evidence on a motion for summary judgment 
is limited.153 Conduct that is as consistent with competition as it is 
with an antitrust violation is insufficient as a matter of law to create a 
jury question.154 In such a situation, a plaintiff must come forward 
with additional evidence to defeat the summary judgment motion.155 
A plaintiff must present evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility 
that the alleged conspirators acted independently.”156 The plaintiff 
must show “the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the 
competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that 
could not have harmed [plaintiff].”157 
Matsushita put to rest any notion that summary judgment is 
inappropriate in antitrust cases. Rule 56 applies equally to all actions 
in federal court. Matsushita also made clear that the standards for 
summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law are one in the 
same.158 Finally, Matsushita made clear that to defeat a summary 
judgment motion, a plaintiff must do more than raise “metaphysical 
doubt”;159 rather, it must adduce evidence about which reasonable 
persons could disagree. 
b. Celotex 
In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, an asbestos case, defendant moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff had failed to adduce 
evidence that exposure to defendant’s asbestos products was the 
 
152 Id. at 596–97 (“if [as here] petitioners had no rational economic motive to conspire, 
and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the conduct 
does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy” (citation omitted)). 
153 See id. at 588 (citation omitted). 
154 Id. (citation omitted). 
155 Id. (citation omitted). 
156 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
157 Id. (citation omitted). 
158 See id. The term “judgment as a matter of law” replaced “directed verdict” in the 
1991 Amendments to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 50 
advisory committee’s note. 
159 Id. at 586 (citation omitted). 
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proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, an element of plaintiff’s claim 
upon which she would bear the burden of proof at trial.160 The Court 
of Appeals ruled that defendant, having failed to introduce evidence 
tending to negate any exposure, was not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.161 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was 
proper because plaintiff failed to show the existence of an element 
essential to which she had the burden of proof at trial.162 Such a 
complete failure of proof with respect to an essential element of the 
case renders all other facts in the case immaterial.163 The Court also 
made clear that summary judgment “is properly regarded not as a 
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the 
Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’”164 
c. Anderson 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. was a defamation action by a 
“citizen’s lobby” against a magazine.165 The Supreme Court held that 
the standard of proof on a motion for summary judgment must mirror 
the standard of proof at trial.166 Here, to succeed at trial, plaintiff 
would have to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, malice on the 
part of the defendant.167 Because the Court of Appeals applied the 
wrong standard, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. 
The 1986 trilogy was a clear signal from the Supreme Court that 
the summary judgment procedure was an integral part of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and that where the Rule 56 standards are 
met, courts should not hesitate to grant summary judgment. 
2. Pleading Standards 
The Federal Rules incorporated the common law demurrer, which 
allowed the defendant to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings at 
 
160 477 U.S. 317, 319–20 (1986). 
161 Id. at 321. 
162 Id. at 322–23. 
163 Id. at 323. 
164 Id. at 327 (citation omitted). 
165 477 U.S. 242, 244–45 (1986). 
166 Id. at 252. 
167 Id. at 257. 
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the outset of a case.168 Accordingly, the Federal Rules permit 
judgment as a matter of law in cases in which the complaint fails to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.169 But, what does that 
language mean? As a threshold matter, the drafters of the Federal 
Rules purposefully chose that language over the formulation of failure 
to state a cause of action used in the codes and in common law 
pleading jurisdictions.170 The Federal Rules eschewed the notion, 
adopted by the codes and by the common law, that a complaint must 
assert all elements of a cause of action.171 Rather, the Federal Rules 
required only facts sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the 
claim.172 
In Conley v. Gibson, decided some twenty years after the 
promulgation of the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court held that “a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”173 The Court 
went on to explain that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that the complaint “give 
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.”174 The “no set of facts” language sets a 
high bar for defendants seeking to dismiss a complaint on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. Taken literally, the language of Conley would vitiate 
almost all motions to dismiss. 
Notwithstanding the demanding standards of Conley, many trial 
courts granted motions to dismiss. However, enough courts balked at 
motions to dismiss on Conley grounds to cause concern among 
defendants who felt that under Conley, paper-thin complaints could 
license expensive discovery, which would leave defendants with no 
choice but to pay to settle the matter, irrespective of the merits of 
 
168 See Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 194–95 
(1957–58); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
169 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
170 See Clark, supra note 168, at 187; see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to 
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 
1, 23–24 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Double Play] (The Federal Rules “substitut[e] ‘short 
and plain’ and ‘claim for relief’ for any reference to the troublesome code categories of 
‘facts,’ ‘conclusions,’ ‘evidence,’ and ‘cause of action.’”); see generally WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 7, §§ 1215–1216. 
171 See Clark, supra note 168, at 186–87. 
172 See id. 
173 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
174 Id. at 47. 
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plaintiffs’ claim.175 Efforts to engage the Advisory Committee on 
Rule 12(b)(6) standards failed, and so defendants turned to the courts. 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court revisited the 
concept of notice pleading, the proper construction of Rule 8(a)(2), 
and the continuing viability of Conley.176 Twombly was a putative 
class action antitrust suit by subscribers of local telephone services 
and high-speed Internet access in the New York City area.177 
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants—the four providers of local 
telephone services in the United States—had violated section one of 
the Sherman Act by conspiring (1) not to provide interconnect 
services to new entrants in the local telephone market as required by 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and (2) not to compete with 
each other in what heretofore had been exclusive territories.178 
Although the complaint alleged that the defendants’ conduct was 
the result of a conspiracy, it contained no factual allegations of 
agreement.179 That is, the complaint did not set forth the times and 
places of any conspiratorial meetings, the participants therein, or the 
contents of any agreement.180 Rather, the plaintiffs claimed that 
conspiracy could be inferred from the fact that defendants had 
declined to compete in each other’s territories, and that at least one 
defendant had frustrated entry into the local telephone market by 
refusing to cooperate in providing interconnect services with the 
prospective new entrant.181 
Defendants countered that in the absence of factual allegations of 
agreement, the complaint, at best, alleged conscious parallelism 
among the defendants.182 As a matter of substantive antitrust 
principles, conscious parallelism is not enough to make out a 
violation of section one of the Sherman Act.183 Given that the 
plaintiffs had failed properly to allege conspiracy, the defendants 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law184 and were not forced to 
 
175 See Miller, Double Play, supra note 170, at 8–9, 14. 
176 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
177 Id. at 550–51. 
178 Id. 
179 See id. at 551. 
180 Id. at 551–52 n.2. 
181 See id. at 550–51. 
182 See id. at 552. 
183 Id. at 553. 
184 Id. at 570. 
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bear the expense of discovery and the related burdens of antitrust 
litigation. 
In dismissing the complaint, the Supreme Court took the 
opportunity to revisit pleading requirements under Rule 8(a)(2).185 
The Court acknowledged that the Federal Rules had relaxed pleading 
standards from the stringent demands under the codes and at common 
law.186 Yet, the Court pointed out that it would be a mistake to 
“suggest[] that the Federal Rules somehow dispensed with the 
pleading of facts altogether.”187 Rather, the Federal Rules simply 
relieved the plaintiff of the obligation of setting forth the claim in 
detail in the pleadings.188 
A plaintiff must make a “showing” that it is “entitled” to relief.189 
This involves “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”190 To 
survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim that is 
“plausible”; that is, it must provide “enough fact to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal 
[conduct].”191 Accordingly, “an allegation of parallel conduct and a 
bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.”192 
Of greater interest is the Court’s rationale in Twombly. A principal 
objective of Twombly’s heightened pleading standard was to stem the 
high cost of discovery. The Court admonished trial courts not “to 
forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive” and 
also observed that high discovery costs may force defendants to settle 
matters early on the litigation timeline, irrespective of the merits of 
the plaintiff’s claim.193 The Court further opined that tools 
traditionally used to identify and eliminate infirm claims—case 
management, supervised discovery, summary judgment, and jury 
instructions—simply do not work, relying on Judge Easterbrook’s 
observations in a 1989 law review comment that courts are powerless 
 
185 Id. at 554–62. 
186 See id. at 555 n.3. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 555. 
189 Id. at 555, 557. 
190 Id. at 555. 
191 Id. at 556. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 558–59. 
CAVANAGH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  10:33 AM 
662 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 631 
to control the claims presented in a case and to control the costs of 
discovery.194 
In so ruling the Court ignored the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and particularly the 1983, 1993, and 2000 Amendments, which, as 
discussed above, conferred broad managerial powers on federal 
judges.195 It is simply not possible that the Court in 2007 was 
unaware of these developments, nor is it likely that the Court was 
ignorant of empirical research demonstrating that discovery abuse 
leading to excessive trial preparation costs was not a problem in the 
vast majority of cases litigated in the federal courts.196 
The salient question is why the Court ruled as it did in Twombly. 
The Twombly ruling was a marked departure from the decision in 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County a decade earlier in which the Court 
stated unequivocally that pleading was a matter for the Advisory 
Committee, not the courts: 
Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against 
municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added 
specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must 
be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not 
by judicial interpretation. In the absence of such an amendment, 
federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and 
control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather 
than later.197 
Moreover, it is undeniable that the Court’s rejection of Leatherman 
was purposeful: 
 It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible 
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the 
discovery process through “careful case management,” . . . given 
the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in 
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side. See, e.g., 
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 635, 638 (1989) 
(“Judges can do little about impositional discovery when parties 
control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the discovery 
themselves”). And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery 
abuse cannot be solved by “careful scrutiny of evidence at the 
summary judgment stage,” much less “lucid instructions to 
 
194 Id. at 559 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 
(1989)). 
195 See supra Part II.B.2.–4. 
196 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph 
of Milton Handler, and the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV. 
LITIG. 1, 24–25 (2008). 
197 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 
163, 168–69 (1993). 
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juries”[;] . . . the threat of discovery expense will push cost-
conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching 
those proceedings. Probably, then, it is only by taking care to 
require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that 
we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery 
in cases with no “‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] 
process will reveal relevant evidence’” to support a § 1 claim.198 
If excessive discovery costs are truly the problem that the Court 
seeks to address, perhaps the better solution is to incentivize district 
courts to enforce the discovery limitations authorized by the Federal 
Rules. The Court cited no post-1989 case law or data on the efficacy 
of discovery limitations, which is really the relevant timeframe here. 
In any event, the Court’s decision that the appropriate way to address 
the problem of excessive discovery costs—dismissing suspect claims 
at the outset of the litigation—seems counterintuitive. The parties and 
the court know the least about the respective claims and defenses at 
the motion to dismiss stage. Still, the Court opted for the most drastic 
remedy, dismissal prior to discovery. This approach undermines a 
basic premise of discovery—equal access to proof199—and thereby 
puts antitrust plaintiffs at a severe disadvantage; defendants have 
exclusive control of all evidence of conspiracy and overt acts in 
furtherance thereof. This approach also puts antitrust plaintiffs in a 
catch-twenty-two situation: they must plead facts showing conspiracy, 
but they are denied access to discovery of those facts through the 
preemptive motion to dismiss. 
Twombly has been the subject of much discussion since the day it 
was decided.200 However, the decision has turned out not to be the 
scourge that its critics feared. Empirical studies reveal only a modest 
uptick in the granting of motions to dismiss.201 Nevertheless, the 
question remains as to whether such a far-reaching change in pleading 
standards was a matter for the courts, or whether any changes should 
 
198 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (alteration in original). 
199 See Miller, supra note 2, at 289. 
200 See, e.g., Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 103. 
201 See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL, at vii (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf 
.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf; see also Memorandum from Andrea 
Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, to Civil Rules Committee and 
Standing Rules Committee 4 (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov 
/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_memo_121510.pdf (“[C]ase law to date does not 
appear to indicate that Iqbal has dramatically changed the application of the standards used 
to determine pleading sufficiency.”). 
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have been left to the rulemaking process. Federal courts have the 
power to interpret the Federal Rules but no power to amend them. 
Some commentators have argued that Twombly improperly crossed 
the line into rulemaking.202 Twombly is surely close to the line, if not 
crossing the line. Indeed Twombly went much further than 
Matsushita. In Matsushita, the Court merely construed the term 
“genuine issue of material fact” in Rule 56(c) in order to determine 
whether summary judgment should have been entered on the record 
before the Court.203 Twombly, on the other hand, enunciated a new 
pleading standard that raised the bar for plaintiffs to get by a motion 
to dismiss and to be in a position to make discovery demands.204 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Advisory Committee has not proposed 
any rulemaking in response to Twombly suggests that it does not view 
the Court in Twombly as having usurped the rulemaking function, 
rendering criticism of Twombly on that basis moot. 
C. Opting Out of the Court System 
A third response to the perceived problems with inadequacies of 
the Federal Rules has been for litigants to flee the federal court 
system in favor of (1) forums outside the United States and (2) 
arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms.205 
1. Flight to Foreign Forums 
In our increasingly globalized economy, more and more foreign 
firms and individuals find themselves subject to the jurisdiction of 
United States law, which differs both substantively and procedurally 
from the laws of their home nations. Private rights of action, 
mandatory treble damages, class actions, pretrial discovery, and jury 
trials—common features of the American system—are unknown in 
many foreign jurisdictions. The jury system is particularly 
 
202 See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on 
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 621, 648, 656 (2010) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s 
disregard for the rulemaking process). 
203 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–88 
(1986). 
204 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). 
205 See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Decision on 
Parties’ Requests for Production of Documents Withheld on Grounds of Privilege  ¶ 20 n.1 
(Nov. 17, 2005) (“[T]he Tribunal recognize[d] that it is generally understood that one 
reason parties choose arbitration is to avoid the relatively expensive document production 
practices of courts generally and United States courts in particular.”). 
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dumbfounding for those who come from civil law regimes. The 
notion of having a legal dispute resolved by six persons—chosen by 
lot, unaffiliated with any of the parties, who know nothing about the 
facts (other than what they hear in court), and nothing about the law 
(other than what the judge tells them)—is troubling and very risky. 
Not surprisingly, foreign firms seek to minimize these and other 
perceived risks by avoiding American courts and American law 
through forum selection and choice of law clauses.206 The courts have 
generally upheld these clauses.207 
2. Alterative Dispute Resolution 
ADR procedures—including arbitration, mediation, neutral 
evaluation, mini-trials, and summary jury trials—have thrived in the 
last three decades in large part because they have been viewed as 
faster and more economical than the courts for resolving disputes.208 
These mechanisms typically permit the parties to control the amount 
and cost of discovery, the length of any hearing, the number of 
witnesses to testify, and even the identity of the finder(s) of fact.209 
ADR is also private, and thus it allows parties to preserve business 
relationships, permits them to adopt innovative remedial techniques, 
and shields any dispute from public scrutiny.210 Additionally, ADR 
 
206 See Jeffery B. Struckhoff, The Irony of Uberrimae Fidei: Bad Faith Practices in 
Marine Insurance, 29 TUL. MAR. L.J. 287, 303–08 (2005); see also Asa Markel, 
American, English and Japanese Warranty Law Compared: Should the U.S. Reconsider 
Her Article 95 Declaration to the CISG?, 21 PACE INT’L L. REV. 163, 174 (2009) (noting 
that international commercial entities go to great lengths to avoid American courts); see 
also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1133–35 (1996) (“foreigners are reluctant to litigate in America for a 
variety of reasons”). 
207 See Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 
134 S. Ct. 568, 579–80 (2013) (enforcing forum selection clause); Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (Forum selection clauses are “prima facie valid and 
should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ 
under the circumstances.”). 
208 See Virginia Knapp Dorell, Picturing a Remedy for Small Claims of Copyright 
Infringement, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 449, 461 (2013) (“An ADR process shares some of the 
benefits of an administrative proceeding, including lower costs, faster resolution of cases 
and an easing of the federal courts’ workload.”). 
209 See David R. Cleveland, Post-Crisis Reconsideration of Federal Court Reform, 61 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 47, 88 (2013); Michael J. Wolf, Collaborative Technology Improves 
Access to Justice, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 773–74 (2012). 
210 Cleveland, supra note 209, at 88; Wolf, supra note 209, at 773–74; see Kristin L. 
Fortin, Reviving the Lawyer’s Role as Servant Leader: The Professional Paradigm and a 
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arrangements can limit damage exposure and effectively insulate 
parties from substantive liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court 
has upheld arbitration provisions banning class actions.211 That, in 
turn, would effectively immunize the defendant from antitrust claims 
when the damages per individual plaintiff are nominal, even if the 
damages in the aggregate are substantial. Finally, ADR mechanisms 
offer hope for civility in resolving disputes which many parties prefer 
over the contentiousness that characterizes much of today’s 
litigation.212 
The principal downside of ADR for users is that the right to appeal 
most decisions rendered in ADR proceedings is “severely 
restricted.”213 There are also significant public interest concerns, 
including lack of public scrutiny, due process protections, systematic 
reporting, stare decisis, and procedure protections—including 
limitations on the rules of discovery and rules of evidence.214 
3. Court-Annexed ADR 
The popularity and success of ADR have not gone unnoticed by the 
courts. Many courts have embraced ADR and brought it into the 
judicial system through various court-annexed ADR programs.215 
Oftentimes, these programs involve certain classes of cases that are 
referred in the first instance to a court-appointed mediator who meets 
with the parties and proposes a resolution.216 The mediator’s proposal 
 
Lawyer’s Ethical Obligation to Inform Clients About Alternative Dispute Resolution, 22 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 618 (2009). 
ADR ensures the most cost-effective, timely, and conciliatory resolution of 
disputes and produces: heightened public satisfaction with the justice system; 
creative resolutions where parties have more autonomy and control over the 
outcome; voluntary compliance with agreements; speedy and generally amicable 
settlement of disputes; community connectedness by restoring the influence of 
neighborhood and community values and reducing social friction; an accessible 
forum for all disputants, including previously unrepresented individuals; a 
reduction in court congestion and costs; and an example of how to effectively 
resolve disputes without resorting to violence or adversarial proceedings. 
Id. 
211 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746, 1753 (2011). 
212 See Fortin, supra note 210, at 618. 
213 Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 49–50 n.32 (1996). 
214 See George A. Martinez, Race, American Law and the State of Nature, 112 W. VA. 
L. REV. 799, 827–28 (2010). 
215 See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT, E. DIST. OF N.Y., DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, 
available at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/forms/DisputeResolutionProcedures.pdf. 
216 Id. 
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is not binding on the parties, and they are free to reject it and go 
forward with the litigation.217 Not all such mediations are successful, 
but many are and thereby free up judicial resources for other cases. 
4. Settlement 
Lawsuits are typically brought because parties to a dispute cannot 
resolve their differences. But, even after the litigation has 
commenced, parties may choose to settle the matter among 
themselves rather than have the matter proceed to judicial resolution. 
Indeed, the lawsuit itself may be the impetus for serious discussions 
among the parties to resolve their dispute. Generally, settlements are 
encouraged. Parties often prefer to have a say in the final outcome 
rather than have that outcome imposed on them. 
On the other hand, there are situations in which settlement does not 
produce a desirable outcome. For example, when a defendant faces a 
claim that is thin on the facts but very expensive to defend, he or she 
may choose to settle rather than to seek exoneration through a trial, 
because settlement is the more cost-effective alternative. Settlements 
under these circumstances bear little relationship to the merits of the 
claims and defenses, and defendants understandably feel coerced.218 
Also, when defendants settle cases in order to prevent public 
disclosure of wrongdoing—such as the manufacture and sale of 
defective products—and then insist on keeping the details of the 
settlement confidential, settlement does not serve the interests of the 
public at large. 
III 
FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM AT THE CROSSROADS 
The events of the last three decades clearly demonstrate that the 
federal civil justice system is now at a crossroads. Courts and litigants 
seem to have lost sight of the overarching goal of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure—that meritorious litigants should have their day in 
court. Concern about high costs of litigation have trumped concern 
that meritorious claims go to trial. By granting summary judgment or 
motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and by denying class 
action certification, the courts are adjudicating matters on truncated 
 
217 Id. 
218 See Handler, The Shift, supra note 52, at 9–12. 
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records at points earlier and earlier on the litigation timeline.219 This 
approach surely saves discovery costs, but we should query whether it 
gives the plaintiff a fair shot at airing his or her claims. 
As discussed above, cost concerns have also led litigants to select 
foreign forums or to opt for ADR solutions.220 This flight from the 
court system, combined with the trend to decide cases at points much 
earlier on the litigation timeline, has created the phenomenon of the 
vanishing civil trial.221 Although the flight from the court system may 
have short-term benefits for those involved in legal disputes, in the 
long run, it serves neither the private interest of litigants nor the 
public interest. 
A. The Importance of Providing and Supporting a Robust Public 
Court System 
Courts have traditionally played a key role in resolving disputes 
among citizens. First, the court system helps to establish behavioral 
norms so that people can live together in harmony.222 Second, the 
courts provide a public forum in which litigants can assert and resolve 
grievances.223 Third, the courts are a valuable source of information 
for the public.224 It is imperative that these functions be preserved. 
1. Establishing Behavioral Norms 
A key function of the law is to create and enforce behavioral 
norms. As Judge Weinstein has observed, “[f]or law to serve its 
function as giving expression to enforceable behavioral norms, it must 
be made publicly for all to see.”225 Court decisions are available to 
all; they not only inform the public of what the law is but also enable 
people to predict outcomes and adjust their conduct accordingly.226 
 
219 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 116–19 (noting the trend 
to move case dispositions to points even earlier on the litigation timeline through summary 
judgment, motions to dismiss, Daubert motions, and class certification). 
220 See supra Part II.C. 
221 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 747. 
222 See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through 
ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 248–49 (1996) [hereinafter Weinsten, Benefits 
and Risks]. 
223 Id. at 251. 
224 See id. at 248–51. 
225 Id. at 249. 
226 Id. 
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2. Public Forum to Resolve Disputes 
The court system provides a public forum, accessible to all, for the 
resolution of disputes among citizens through litigation. Although 
some observers have criticized the United States as a litigious 
society,227 litigation itself is not bad. Rather, litigation is an important 
tool in the civil justice system. Indeed, the courts exist to bring about 
the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of claims.228 Litigation 
plays a crucial role in preserving and extending the rule of law. 
a. The Public Interest Is Served Through Litigation 
The court system provides more than just a public forum for 
resolving disputes. Courts, through litigation, construe statutes and 
common law precedents through principled decisions. Judicial 
decisions are subject to public scrutiny and protest.229 Parties to a 
case may appeal adverse results. Through the appellate process, legal 
issues are carefully and thoughtfully analyzed and resolved. Decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court become the law of the land. 
Under stare decisis, common law assures that like cases are treated 
alike. 
The Constitution confers adjudicatory powers on the judiciary. 
However, as the Supreme Court observed in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court “cannot buy support 
for its decisions . . . and, except to a minor degree, it cannot 
independently coerce obedience to its decrees.”230 Rather, the Court 
noted, its “power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and 
perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the 
Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to 
declare what it demands.”231 Legitimacy requires more than justifying 
a judicial act by reference to legal principle; “the Court’s legitimacy 
depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances 
 
227 See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 3–5 
(1986). But see Weinstein, After Fifty Years, supra note 20, at 1907–09 (“Concern over 
excessive litigation in the federal courts is old hat . . . [and] also typically exaggeration. . . . 
The truth about the ‘litigation explosion’ is that it is a weapon of perception, not substance. 
If the public can be persuaded that there is a litigation crisis, it may support efforts to cut 
back on litigation access.”). 
228 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
229 See Weinstein, Benefits and Risks, supra note 222, at 250–51. 
230 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). 
231 Id. 
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in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be 
accepted by the Nation.”232 
That the Court’s decision be viewed as legitimate is especially 
important when fundamental rights are at stake. For example, 
decisions by the Supreme Court on civil rights issues—such as, the 
right to vote or the right to be free from racial discrimination—inure 
for the benefit of the entire populace and not just the parties before 
the court. 
Although access to public courts is important, the right of access is 
not without limitations. The doctrines of claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion, closely related to the concept of stare decisis, bar a party 
from relitigating claims and from relitigating issues that have 
previously been litigated and decided by the courts. These concepts 
thereby promote not only consistency of results but also provide 
peace and efficiency to the litigants and the courts.233 
b. Development of the Law 
Litigation plays a key role in the development of the law. First, 
litigation is a vehicle for overruling bad precedents. The rulings in 
some cases are simply wrong and should be overruled. For example, 
the “separate but equal” doctrine enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson,234 
which licensed state-sanctioned racial segregation, was morally 
offensive and contrary to the Constitution. Plessy, of course, was 
eventually overruled by Brown v. Board of Education.235 As a result 
of Brown, state-authorized racial segregation was illegal throughout 
the United States.236 Imagine if Brown had been decided by an 
arbitrator instead of the courts. Any arbitrator’s decision would not 
have been the law of the land but rather would have bound only those 
who had been parties to the proceedings. Litigation brought about a 
major change in the law that an arbitrator would have been powerless 
to implement. 
Other cases, although perhaps not morally offensive like Plessy, 
are nevertheless wrongly decided and also should be overruled. These 
cases attract criticism from commentators and the courts, calling for 
 
232 Id. at 866. 
233 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18, 27 (1982). Claim preclusion is 
sometimes referred to as the rule of merger. Id. § 23. 
234 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
235 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954). 
236 See id. at 495–96. 
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the precedent to be reexamined. The Erie237 line of cases is an apt 
example. This line of cases begins with the 1840 decision of Swift v. 
Tyson, in which the Supreme Court held that a federal court sitting in 
diversity is free to ignore a state’s common law and apply instead 
federal general common law.238 Over the next century, it became 
clear that Swift had (1) failed to produce the hoped-for uniform law 
governing commercial practices, (2) gave rise to the unsavory forum-
shopping tactics, (3) produced blatantly unfair results, and (4) 
probably misconstrued the Rules of Decisions Act ab initio.239 In its 
lifetime, Swift had been the target of withering judicial and academic 
criticism.240 
In 1938, the Supreme Court in Erie overruled Swift, concluding 
that Swift was “‘an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts 
of the United States.’”241 Diversity jurisdiction may offer litigants a 
federal forum, but it does not entitle them to results that would be 
substantially different from the results in state court.242 After Erie, the 
rule of decision in diversity cases was provided by state law, whether 
statutory or court-made, thereby minimizing the true evils of forum-
shopping and inequitable administration of the law. 
Similarly, in the area of prior judgments, litigation has been the 
vehicle to eliminate bad precedents. It is a fundamental rule of res 
judicata that a person who is not a party to a judgment cannot be 
bound by that judgment.243 But may a person who is not a party to a 
judgment benefit from that judgment? Initially, the courts answered 
that question in the negative and developed the rule of mutuality of 
estoppel: one not bound by a judgment cannot benefit from that 
judgment.244 The rule of mutuality “provided a party who had 
 
237 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
238 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842). 
239 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–79. 
240 Id. at 74 nn.7–8. 
241 Id. at 79. 
242 See id. 
243 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 
761–62 (1989) (“‘[I]t is a principle of general application in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he 
is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of 
process.’ . . . This rule is part of our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should 
have his own day in court.’” (citations omitted)). 
244 See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 
(1912) (“It is a principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be 
mutual.”). 
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litigated and lost in a previous action an opportunity to relitigate 
identical issues with new parties.”245 The rule of mutuality, which is 
rooted in fairness,246 often ran counter to basic rules of preclusion, 
which are rooted in finality, efficiency, and consistency.247 Too often, 
the rule of mutuality simply permitted the defendant to get a second 
bite of the apple and relitigate a case that it already lost once before. 
The courts first created fact-specific exceptions to the rule of 
mutuality.248 Eventually, however, it became clear that the rule 
limited the application of collateral estoppel principles without 
significant concomitant benefit.249 As long as a defendant had his or 
her day in court, i.e., a full and fair opportunity to litigate the case, the 
defendant was foreclosed from relitigating issues that had been raised, 
litigated, and adjudicated in prior actions.250 
Finally, litigation played a key role in the evolution of the law of 
vertical restraints in antitrust law. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn 
& Co., the Supreme Court held that when a manufacturer departed 
with “title, dominion, and risk” with respect to a good that it had sold, 
any effort by the manufacturer to control where and to whom a 
reseller could dispose of the product was unlawful on its face under 
section one of the Sherman Act.251 Schwinn generated confusion in 
the marketplace and was the subject of significant academic 
criticism.252 A decade later, the Supreme Court reversed Schwinn in 
the landmark Sylvania case and held that vertically imposed territorial 
restraints are unlawful only when the plaintiff can prove demonstrable 
 
245 Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979). 
246 See id. 
247 See Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in 
Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1723 (1968). 
248 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349–50 
(1971) (determining that a defendant in a patent infringement litigation may plead issue 
preclusion when the patent had been held invalid in a prior case against another 
defendant); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 895–96 
(Cal. 1942) (holding that the rule of mutuality does not apply in cases of imputed liability 
when a plaintiff unsuccessfully sues the alleged active tortfeasor and then seeks to sue the 
alleged passive wrongdoer). “No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the 
requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action should 
be precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound by it is 
difficult to comprehend.” Id. at 895. 
249 See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331–32. 
250 Id. at 332–33. 
251 388 U.S. 365, 381–82 (1967). 
252 See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 n.13 (1977). 
CAVANAGH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  10:33 AM 
2015] Federal Civil Litigation at the Crossroads: Reshaping the 673 
Role of the Federal Courts in Twenty-First Century Dispute Resolution 
anticompetitive effects.253 Rarely is that the case, and today, non-
price vertical restraints are virtually per se lawful. 
Sylvania led to a rethinking of vertically imposed price restraints—
resale price maintenance (“r/p/m”). In its 1911 Dr. Miles decision, the 
Supreme Court ruled that r/p/m was per se illegal.254 Critics of Dr. 
Miles argued that, in the wave of Sylvania, per se condemnation of 
r/p/m was no longer viable.255 Critics also argued that r/p/m, as in the 
case of non-price vertical restraints, may offer significant pro-
competitive benefits, including promotion of inter-brand competition, 
introduction of services to the buyer, elimination of free riding and 
promotion of new products.256 Accordingly, r/p/m ought not to be 
condemned out of hand. 
The Supreme Court first addressed maximum r/p/m in State Oil 
Co. v. Khan, ruling that maximum r/p/m generally resulted in low 
prices to consumers and consequently ought not to be summarily 
condemned.257 The Court in Khan, however, left for another day the 
issue of minimum r/p/m and thus did not disturb Dr. Miles.258 
Nevertheless, when the Court did revisit Dr. Miles in Leegin v. PSKS, 
Inc., it overruled Dr. Miles—relying heavily on the principles set 
forth in both Sylvania and Khan—holding that r/p/m should be 
condemned only when anticompetitive effects outweigh any pro-
competitive benefits.259 
c. Certainty and Predictability in the Law 
Litigation also promotes certainty and predictability in the law. The 
r/p/m line of cases also illustrates this point. Soon after Dr. Miles, 
courts authorized ways around the per se rule. For example, in United 
States v. Colgate & Co., the Court held that a manufacturer could 
unilaterally announce in advance its terms of sale, including a 
“suggested” resale price.260 As long as the retailer did not “agree” to 
those terms, the conduct would be outside the scope of the first 
 
253 Id. at 59. 
254 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407–09 (1911). 
255 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
288–91 (1978). 
256 Id. 
257 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997). 
258 Id. (making clear that Khan addresses only maximum price fixing). 
259 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899–901, 907 
(2007). 
260 250 U.S. 300, 306–07 (1919). 
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section of the Sherman Act.261 On the one hand, if the retailer sold at 
a price other than the suggested resale price, it could be lawfully 
terminated under Colgate. In addition, courts held that when the 
manufacturer retained legal ownership of the goods and distributed 
them through an agency model, Dr. Miles did not apply.262 
Colgate and its progeny created significant uncertainties in 
distribution law as to (1) what constituted an agreement to fix resale 
prices; (2) whether the termination of a discounting retailer was the 
unilateral act of the manufacturer or done in concert with, and at the 
behest of, complaining rivals of the discounter; (3) precisely what 
steps a manufacturer could take in enforcing its “unilateral” terms of 
sale; and (4) whether the manufacturer’s distribution system was a 
true agency relationship or a disguised sales system dressed up as an 
agency model. The answer to these questions created a patchwork 
quilt of confusing and often inconsistent precedents.263 
Leegin eliminated the uncertainties that arose in the aftermath of 
Colgate. All vertical restraints would be adjudged under the rule of 
reason.264 No longer would courts engage in technical hairsplitting as 
to whether (1) conduct is unilateral or conspiratorial, (2) the 
distribution system is a true agency system, or (3) the resale price is 
suggested or mandatory. The question post-Leegin is whether the 
anticompetitive effects of the conduct outweigh the pro-competitive 
benefits.265 
Certainty and predictability clearly benefit buyers and sellers 
participating in a given marketplace who can now predict the 
consequences of their actions with some certainty. Clear rules also 
make law accessible to litigants seeking to bring private enforcement 
actions, and it facilitates private rights of action. Moreover, as rules 
become clearer and more predictable, the need for litigation in the 
long run is diminished. 
 
261 See id. 
262 United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 486–88, 490 (1926). 
263 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 902–04 (pointing out the confusion that has arisen in the 
wake of Dr. Miles and concluding that “it is a flawed antitrust doctrine that serves the 
interests of lawyers―by creating legal distinctions that operate as traps for the 
unwary―by requiring manufacturers to choose second-best options to achieve sound 
business objectives”). 
264 Id. at 882. 
265 See id. at 882, 892. 
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3. Public Courts Provide Information 
The court system also functions as an important source of 
information which may bear on public safety and welfare.266 For 
example, lawsuits can call public attention to life-threatening defects 
in the design or manufacture of automobiles or to heretofore 
undisclosed side effects of certain prescription medicines. Were 
people left solely to private means of dispute resolution, these 
problems might never come to light and continue to menace society. 
B. The Downsides of ADR 
First, ADR is one-dimensional in the sense that it is geared solely 
toward dispute resolution; ADR panels are accountable only to the 
(paying) parties before them. ADR may effectively resolve the private 
dispute before the panel, but that which serves private interests does 
not necessarily serve the public interest as well. In litigation, the 
courts monitor the public interest; no one fills that role in ADR.267 
Second, unlike court decisions, ADR decisions are not subject to 
public scrutiny. For example, ADR decisions are not systematically 
reported. ADR panels are not required to issue reasoned decisions, 
nor are they bound by prior decisions, whether by courts or other 
ADR panels. Principles of stare decisis do not apply to ADR. ADR 
rulings are not appealable within the court system. Accordingly, the 
“law” that evolves through ADR is not accessible to the public; and 
there is no systemic mechanism for the law to evolve in the ADR 
realm. Rather, ADR may serve to freeze the law at a given point in 
time. 
Third, ADR may be used as an instrument of oppression when 
parties to a dispute lack equal bargaining power. It is one thing to 
agree to ADR as part of an arm’s length negotiation. It is quite 
another for a dominant seller to impose ADR upon an unwary 
consumer or customer. For example, in the securities industry, 
brokers use contracts of adhesion with ADR provisions to steer 
disputes clear of the courts.268 This tactical use of ADR to forum-
shop and avoid unfavorable judicial precedent is not what ADR 
proponents had in mind in trumpeting the benefits of ADR. 
 
266 Weinstein, Benefits and Risks, supra note 222, at 251. 
267 Id. at 260, 262–63. 
268 Id. at 260–61. 
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Fourth, this tactical use of ADR calls into question the fairness of 
the process.269 In the courts, judges are randomly assigned to cases 
and must disqualify themselves if they have bias or any financial 
interest in the case. In ADR cases, particularly securities cases, panel 
members are often drawn from the ranks of industry management and 
may bring with them a pro-industry bias.270 
More fundamentally, as the wealthy flee the courts system, a two-
tiered system of justice is taking shape: a private system of ADR for 
the wealthy, and a public court system that is left to handle criminal 
cases and disputes among the poor.271 This flight from the courts 
threatens to reduce the power of the courts over society generally.272 
Fifth, ADR has generally been touted as cheaper than litigating in 
the courts. That is not necessarily so today. Arbitrations, in particular, 
mimic full-blown judicial trials, with extensive pre-hearing 
discovery.273 In ADR, parties may incur significant upfront fees for 
the panels and administrative expenses.274 This is, of course, not the 
case in the court system in which judges are compensated through tax 
dollars, and litigants pay flat filing fees to cover administrative costs. 
Nor does ADR necessarily reduce attorneys fees, since attorneys must 
be paid whether in court or in ADR. 
Equally important, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have 
detailed standards for moving cases along from complaint to 
resolution. ADR cases, on the other hand, move at a pace dictated by 
the panels; proceedings could be drawn out for years.275 Rather than 
have the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to govern proceedings, 
ADR subjects parties to the panel’s make-it-up-as-you-go protocol. 
IV 
GETTING BACK ON TRACK IN THE POST-TWOMBLY WORLD 
The federal courts have a unique opportunity to reclaim litigants 
who have migrated to ADR over the last three decades. To do so, the 
courts must adjust to the realities of twenty-first century litigation 
with a three-pronged strategy. First, the courts must embrace the 
 
269 See id. at 261. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
272 Id. at 261–62. 
273 See Ileana Blanco & Tanya C. Edwards, Arbitration v. Litigation Pros and Cons: 
What Business Lawyers Need to Know, 69 TEX. B. J. 858, 859 (2006). 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
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proportionality standards for pleading suggested in Twombly, which 
means that the amount of factual detail required for a pleading to 
survive a motion to dismiss varies depending on the complexity of the 
case. Second, the courts must impose appropriate limitations on 
discovery as authorized by the Federal Rules. Third, the courts must 
set, and adhere to, deadlines for the completion of discovery and the 
commencement of trial. 
A. Harmonizing the Ideals of the Federal Rules with Realities of 
Litigation 
1. Proportionality 
The plausibility standard enunciated in Twombly and reaffirmed in 
Iqbal is fluid, not fixed.276 In a nutshell, Twombly and Iqbal held that 
the level of factual content in the complaint is directly proportional to 
the complexity of the case and the likely discovery costs.277 Thus, 
when a plaintiff alleges a complex antitrust conspiracy, threadbare 
allegations of agreement coupled with stray assertions of consciously 
parallel behavior simply will not pass muster under Twombly.278 On 
the other hand, in a run-of-the-mill negligence claim arising from an 
automobile accident, detailed factual allegations are unnecessary.279 
The Court in Twombly and Iqbal was also concerned with the high 
costs of false positives. In Twombly, the Court declined to condemn 
conduct “just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and 
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common 
perceptions of the market” as it would have with unlawful 
conspiracy.280 Condemning conduct that could be just as consistent 
with “competition” as it would be with “conspiracy” would tend to 
chill beneficial pro-competitive behavior.281 On the other hand, when 
the conduct is more egregious and less defensible, the enhanced 
pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal “[are] not justified.”282 
 
276 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 134–35. 
277 See Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he height of the 
pleading requirement is relative to circumstances.”). 
278 See In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2010). 
279 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007). 
280 Id. at 554. 
281 Id. 
282 Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False 
Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 66 (2010). 
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Context, good judgment, and common sense―not any quick 
fact/conclusion bucketing—should guide the court’s decision on the 
sufficiency of a complaint challenged on a motion to dismiss. This is 
nothing new. As the court in Austen v. Catterton Partners V, LP 
observed, “[c]ontext, good judgment and common sense mattered 
long before the Supreme Court decided Twombly and Iqbal.”283 The 
court in Austen offered the following example as to how Twombly and 
Iqbal should be sensibly applied in passing on the sufficiency of a 
complaint without jumping into the thorny fact/conclusion thicket. 
If a plaintiff says that a defendant intended to, and did, punch the 
plaintiff in the nose, is that a statement of fact about the defendant’s 
act and intent, or is it a conclusion since none of us is a mind reader? 
In most circumstances, the Court would consider that statement to be 
one of fact that the Court would be required to assume is true for 
purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. On the other hand, if a plaintiff 
baldly asserts that she was subjected to a “hostile work environment” 
without more, the Court would consider that statement be a mere 
conclusion—in the parlance of the Supreme Court, a “threadbare 
recital”—to which the Court need not defer. In the latter example, 
further facts would be needed (and in this example, the plaintiff 
certainly would know what environment she had been subjected to) in 
order to provide adequate notice to the defendant of the basis for the 
lawsuit and to make the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim 
plausible.284 
2. Special Cases 
Certain factual situations call for the courts to be circumspect in 
applying Twombly. For example, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that Twombly does not change the longstanding policy of giving pro 
se plaintiffs wide latitude in pleading.285 Courts should be 
circumspect in dismissing complaints when evidence of wrongdoing 
is in the hands of the defendant exclusively.286 Under those 
circumstances, the plaintiff cannot prove its case without access to 
defendant’s files but, at the same time, cannot get discovery without 
first suing. In such cases, the better approach would be for the court to 
 
283 Austen v. Catterton Partners V, LP, 709 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172 (D. Conn. 2010). 
284 Id. at 171–72. 
285 See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). 
286 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 137; see, e.g., Bausch v. 
Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding an error to dismiss with 
prejudice where relevant information was confidential under federal law). 
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give plaintiff the opportunity to conduct limited and specifically 
targeted discovery before considering a motion to dismiss the 
complaint.287 The amount of discovery allowed in such cases would 
be governed by the proportionality principles embedded in Rule 
26(b)(3) and the sound discretion of the court.288 
In addition, in private damage actions that follow successful 
government prosecutions of the defendant(s), motions to dismiss on 
Twombly grounds should be granted only in the most unusual cases. 
The success of the prior government prosecutions should allay any 
concern that the private action is “largely groundless.”289 In these 
cases, a poorly drafted complaint is best addressed by a remedy other 
than dismissal. In short, there is a presumption of merit in private 
actions that are follow-ons to successful government enforcement 
actions. This presumption of merit would apply, however, when 
defendants are merely subject to a government investigation, and no 
action has been filed. 
3. Dismissal Without Prejudice 
As a general matter, courts can ease the harshness of Twombly by 
dismissing defective complaints without prejudice.290 If the plaintiff 
fails to address the deficiencies in its complaint after they have been 
identified by the courts, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Of 
course, in those cases when no amount of factual allegations can cure 
the defects in the complaint, the trial court may dismiss with prejudice 
in the first instance. 
B. Embrace the Federal Rules on Discovery 
As discussed above, the driving force behind the Twombly holding 
was the Court’s concern about the high cost of discovery and the fact 
that the threat of high discovery costs can be used to coerce 
settlements that may not be justified by the merits of a claim. The 
high cost of discovery has been, and continues to be, a major issue in 
federal civil litigation. At the same time, the Court’s cavalier 
 
287 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 137. 
288 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
289 Cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (citations omitted). 
290 In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 781 F. Supp. 2d. 955, 959 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (“The Ninth Circuit has ‘repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to 
amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 
pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” (citation omitted)). 
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dismissiveness of the discovery scheme under the Federal Rules is 
troublesome. The Court simply throws up its hands and says that 
discovery is controlled by the parties, not the court. That is simply not 
the case. The 1983 Amendments and the 1993 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules vest the trial court with broad powers to control 
discovery. The trial court must approve a discovery plan before the 
process can begin.291 As part of the planning process, the court can 
impose numerical limits on the number of interrogatories,292 the 
number of depositions,293 and the court can limit the length of any 
deposition.294 Courts can control discovery and its costs. 
The Court’s dismissiveness is also troubling from a process 
perspective. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern procedure 
and practice in federal courts. Trial courts are not free to disregard 
rules that they believe are ineffective. If a rule does not work, it 
should be changed through the established rulemaking process, not 
simply ignored by the courts on an ad hoc basis. The willingness of 
the Court in Twombly to ignore the Federal Rules raises issues of 
fairness as well as the appearance of fairness. 
Thus, the problems of discovery costs are not for want of having 
tools to control those costs, but rather for lack of will of judges to 
utilize those tools. The rules cannot work if they are not utilized. To 
paraphrase John Lennon, “[a]ll we are saying is give [the rules] a 
chance.”295 Active case management has long been recognized as an 
effective vehicle for reducing costs and delay. This is not to suggest 
that every case needs to be micromanaged. Nor is it necessary for the 
judge to actively oversee discovery. A judge may elect to delegate 
that task to a magistrate judge. The hallmark of the discovery rules is 
their flexibility. The court can choose those cases that would benefit 
from close oversight during the pretrial phase and decide in any given 
case whether the judge or a magistrate judge is the appropriate case 
manager. Discovery is manageable, and the surgical approach 
embodied in the Federal Rules is preferable to the nuclear option 
embraced by Twombly. 
 
291 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
292 FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a). 
293 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2). 
294 Id. 
295 PLASTIC ONO BAND, Give Peace a Chance (Apple Records 1969). 
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C. Restore Confidence in the Federal Courts 
For the last forty years, the federal courts have been under siege 
from (1) defendants, who view the federal court system as too 
expensive and time-consuming; (2) plaintiffs, who view the courts as 
too eager to resolve cases short of trial; and (3) Congress, which 
views the federal courts as too costly and unwieldy to effectively 
serve the people. Whether public perceptions are accurate or not is 
largely irrelevant because they have led to tangible consequences. 
Defendants have fled federal courts in favor of ADR or foreign 
forums. Plaintiffs have sought refuge in state courts. Congress 
enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 in an attempt to make 
federal courts both accessible and cost-effective. 
As discussed above, the ADR movement has had many benefits for 
its participants, but it also has had some undesirable spillover effects. 
First, it is now clear that ADR is not always voluntary and has been 
used by large institutions to keep consumers out of the courts. 
Second, ADR decisions do not create transparent precedent that is 
known to all and enforceable in the courts. Rather, ADR creates 
opaque precedents—that are known to arbitrators and participants in 
ADR and not generally binding nor subject to judicial review. 
It is crucial that we maintain a federal court system that is 
accessible to all, that levels the playing field among litigants, that 
offers juries as fact finders to bring the wisdom of the community to 
bear on the resolution of a dispute, and that creates precedent that is 
known to all and binding on all. Federal courts are public institutions 
created by law and ultimately accountable to the public. The courts 
are empowered to construe the law, to develop legal precedents 
accessible to the public, and to make authoritative pronouncements 
binding on the public. The federal courts, however, do more than 
simply resolve disputes among parties. Federal courts provide 
mechanisms, such as contempt, to assure that their decisions are 
respected by the parties. Rulings of the courts can be tested by the 
appellate process, and erroneous decisions can be corrected. Outdated 
precedents can be cast aside in favor of rulings that reflect modern 
realities. 
None of this can be accomplished through ADR mechanisms or 
settlement agreements. As Professor Owen Fiss observed: 
 Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers 
chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in 
which the public participates. These officials, like members of the 
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legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has been 
defined and conferred by public law, not by private agreement. 
Their job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply 
to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values 
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and 
statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord 
with them. This duty is not discharged when the parties settle. 
 In our political system, courts are reactive institutions. They do 
not search out interpretive occasions, but instead wait for others to 
bring matters to their attention. They also rely for the most part on 
others to investigate and present the law and facts. A settlement will 
thereby deprive a court of the occasions, and perhaps even the 
ability, to render an interpretation. A court cannot proceed (or not 
proceed very far) in the face of a settlement. To be against 
settlement is not to urge that parties be “forced” to litigate, since 
that would interfere with their autonomy and distort the adjudicative 
process; the parties will be inclined to make the court believe that 
their bargain is justice. To be against settlement is only to suggest 
that when the parties settle, society gets less than what appears, and 
for a price it does not know it is paying. Parties might settle while 
leaving justice undone. The settlement of a school suit might secure 
the peace, but not racial equality. Although the parties are prepared 
to live under the terms they bargained for, and although such 
peaceful coexistence may be a necessary precondition of justice, 
and itself a state of affairs to be valued, it is not justice itself. To 
settle for something means to accept less than some ideal.296 
Upon sober reflection, two propositions are clear: (1) the federal 
court, although not above reproach, has gotten a bad rap; and (2) 
ADR is not a panacea for the perceived ills of the courts. But, how 
does the court system reclaim those litigants who have fled? The 
answer is not easy. Or, is it? The CJRA was a far-reaching reform 
proposal that required each of the ninety-four district courts to study 
the reason for unnecessary cost and delay in its particular district, and 
then to propose a plan to address the specific problems identified. The 
CJRA, however, did little to affect the perceived problems of 
excessive cost and delay. Rather, it created more confusion than 
clarity by adding yet another layer of local rules to the court system. 
Evaluating the CJRA in 1997, the RAND Corporation acknowledged 
that the CJRA had failed to achieve its goals.297 
After millions of dollars had been poured into the CJRA, RAND, 
in its evaluation, concluded that the most effective tools to limit 
excessive costs and delay were through the courts establishing and 
 
296 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–86 (1984). 
297 See THE RAND REPORT, supra note 71, at 1–3. 
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adhering to early and strict deadlines for the completion of discovery 
and setting firm trial dates. Perhaps the way forward for federal courts 
is simple: adhere to the Federal Rules; set and enforce early, firm 
discovery deadlines; manage discovery when necessary; and permit 
meritorious cases to proceed to trial. At the same time, the courts 
should avail themselves of technological advances that make 
litigation more efficient and the court system more user-friendly. 
CONCLUSION 
It is imperative that we maintain a vibrant federal civil justice 
system, not only to resolve disputes among litigants but also to 
maintain confidence in the rule of law. The court system must reclaim 
the lost generation of litigants who have taken flight and become, in 
Judge Weinstein’s words, “the beacon to which those with serious 
substantive grievances could turn for direction toward justice.”298 
  
 
298 See Weinstein, After Fifty Years, supra note 20, at 1906. 
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